diff --git a/metadata/entries/Automated_Stateful_Protocol_Verification.toml b/metadata/entries/Automated_Stateful_Protocol_Verification.toml
--- a/metadata/entries/Automated_Stateful_Protocol_Verification.toml
+++ b/metadata/entries/Automated_Stateful_Protocol_Verification.toml
@@ -1,45 +1,45 @@
title = "Automated Stateful Protocol Verification"
date = 2020-04-08
topics = [
"Computer science/Security",
"Tools",
]
abstract = """
In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully
automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants
like Isabelle/HOL. In this AFP entry, we present a fully-automated
approach for verifying stateful security protocols, i.e., protocols
with mutable state that may span several sessions. The approach
supports reachability goals like secrecy and authentication. We also
include a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol
specification language that is embedded into Isabelle."""
license = "bsd"
note = ""
[authors]
[authors.hess]
email = "hess_email"
[authors.moedersheim]
homepage = "moedersheim_homepage"
[authors.brucker]
homepage = "brucker_homepage"
[authors.schlichtkrull]
homepage = "schlichtkrull_homepage"
[contributors]
[notify]
hess = "hess_email1"
moedersheim = "moedersheim_email"
-brucker = "brucker_email1"
+brucker = "brucker_email2"
schlichtkrull = "schlichtkrull_email"
[history]
[extra]
[related]
diff --git a/metadata/entries/Featherweight_OCL.toml b/metadata/entries/Featherweight_OCL.toml
--- a/metadata/entries/Featherweight_OCL.toml
+++ b/metadata/entries/Featherweight_OCL.toml
@@ -1,62 +1,62 @@
title = "Featherweight OCL: A Proposal for a Machine-Checked Formal Semantics for OCL 2.5"
date = 2014-01-16
topics = [
"Computer science/System description languages",
]
abstract = """
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is one of the few
modeling languages that is widely used in industry. While
UML is mostly known as diagrammatic modeling language
(e.g., visualizing class models), it is complemented by a
textual language, called Object Constraint Language
(OCL). The current version of OCL is based on a four-valued
logic that turns UML into a formal language. Any type
comprises the elements \"invalid\" and \"null\" which are
propagated as strict and non-strict, respectively.
Unfortunately, the former semi-formal semantics of this
specification language, captured in the \"Annex A\" of the
OCL standard, leads to different interpretations of corner
cases. We formalize the core of OCL: denotational
definitions, a logical calculus and operational rules that
allow for the execution of OCL expressions by a mixture of
term rewriting and code compilation. Our formalization
reveals several inconsistencies and contradictions in the
current version of the OCL standard. Overall, this document
is intended to provide the basis for a machine-checked text
\"Annex A\" of the OCL standard targeting at tool
implementors."""
license = "bsd"
note = ""
[authors]
[authors.brucker]
-email = "brucker_email1"
+email = "brucker_email2"
[authors.tuong]
email = "tuong_email"
[authors.wolff]
email = "wolff_email"
[contributors]
[notify]
-brucker = "brucker_email1"
+brucker = "brucker_email2"
tuong = "tuong_email"
wolff = "wolff_email"
[history]
2015-10-13 = """
afp-devel@ea3b38fc54d6 and
hol-testgen@12148
Update of Featherweight OCL including a change in the abstract.
"""
2014-01-16 = """
afp-devel@9091ce05cb20 and
hol-testgen@10241
New Entry: Featherweight OCL"""
[extra]
[related]
diff --git a/metadata/entries/Stateful_Protocol_Composition_and_Typing.toml b/metadata/entries/Stateful_Protocol_Composition_and_Typing.toml
--- a/metadata/entries/Stateful_Protocol_Composition_and_Typing.toml
+++ b/metadata/entries/Stateful_Protocol_Composition_and_Typing.toml
@@ -1,47 +1,47 @@
title = "Stateful Protocol Composition and Typing"
date = 2020-04-08
topics = [
"Computer science/Security",
]
abstract = """
We provide in this AFP entry several relative soundness results for
security protocols. In particular, we prove typing and
compositionality results for stateful protocols (i.e., protocols with
mutable state that may span several sessions), and that focuses on
reachability properties. Such results are useful to simplify protocol
verification by reducing it to a simpler problem: Typing results give
conditions under which it is safe to verify a protocol in a typed
model where only \"well-typed\" attacks can occur whereas
compositionality results allow us to verify a composed protocol by
only verifying the component protocols in isolation. The conditions on
the protocols under which the results hold are furthermore syntactic
in nature allowing for full automation. The foundation presented here
is used in another entry to provide fully automated and formalized
security proofs of stateful protocols."""
license = "bsd"
note = ""
[authors]
[authors.hess]
email = "hess_email"
[authors.moedersheim]
homepage = "moedersheim_homepage"
[authors.brucker]
homepage = "brucker_homepage"
[contributors]
[notify]
hess = "hess_email1"
moedersheim = "moedersheim_email"
-brucker = "brucker_email1"
+brucker = "brucker_email2"
schlichtkrull = "schlichtkrull_email"
[history]
[extra]
[related]